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1. INTRODUCTION 
Opposed by the United States, who fear an extension of Euro-
pean preferential zones, misunderstood by the new member states 
of the Community, for whom the Mediterranean, as a region, is a 
flight of the immagination, criticized by the Community farmers, 
who fear conpetition froin similar products, the Mediterranean Po-
licy of the Europe of the Nine is experiencing a slow and difficult 
development. 
These reactions to the trans-Mediterranean links that have been 
created in the last ten years between a Europe that is proceeding 
towards its objective of integration and this explosive 'melange' 
of tensions and poverty that characterize the shores of the Medi-
terranean are not unfounded. The agreements signed between the 
European Community and this region, which is essential for its se-
curity, have caused the traditional majority enjoyed by the United 
States in GATT to transfer to the EEC which is supported by Me-
diterranean countries interested either in the eventual adhesion to 
the EEC or in the ct(;ation of a free trade area with Europe. Fur-
thermore, a co-operation free from the old imperialistic/colonial 
implications could easily sp];ead, through -the Arab states on the 
shores of the Mediterranean, to those of t!"le Arab peninsula supply-
ing oil. This could mean a dialogue between the energy thirsty Eu-
rope and the states that possess the precious oil, with an obvious 
danger for the large oil multinational corporations that have tradi-
tionally acted as the intermediaries for the product. Moreover, a 
* The OpInlOnS expressed in the article belong to the author and conse-
quently do not bind anyone except him. 
The original version of this article, in French, was published in the 
Europe an Year book 1973. 
Translated by John C. Grech - Translator appoligises for any inaccura-
cies or limitation on the author's style of writing caused by translation. 
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long term agreement at reasonable prices between the Arab States 
and the Community could imply that the U.S.A. would be deprived 
of part of its energy needs, with the coming of the 1980' s. 
The British hesitation to join in a concerted action in the Medi-
terranean, on the other hand, finds its origin more in the traditional 
intellectual failure to consider the Mediterranean as a region, than 
in political choice. In the British tradition financial and economic 
co-operation has proved to be an option of a global nature (a policy 
oriented towards the developing countries as a whole) or dictated 
by specific operations connected with strategic exigencies (Cyp-
rus, Malta, Gibraltar). To follow a regional approach in the Medi-
terranean for the new member States seems to imply a set-up which 
lacks an accepted foundation. This attitude is all the more under-
standable since the Mediterranean, the region from where our civi-
lization sprung and which has been a centre for cultural and eco-
nomic cultivation, seems to have disappeared as an entity for two 
thousand years. The international organizations (U.N.O., OECD, 
GATT, UNCTAD) have divided it between Europe, Asia and Africa 
like all the national ministers and the geographical publications. 
The obj ections raised by the peasants of the Mediterranean re-
gions of the Community against the concessions given (and to be 
gi ven) to competing products of the region in the context of pre-
ferential agreements is also understandable. Coming from poor re-
gions relative to the opulent industrialized parts of Europe, the 
peasants ask why, being the least secure, it should be them that 
pay the burden of a European policy aimed at favouring their Medi-
terranean neighbours. The rea~tions became all the stronger as the 
Common Agricultural Policy has opened the Common Market to the 
large wheat and sugar produc~rs of the northern regions giving 
them a locational advantage relative to the marginal producers. 
Whilst the small land holders of Calabria and Languedoc still a-
wait the hypothetical benefits from an aid policy for structural 
changes necessaty to ensure them a more equitable income. 
Nevertheless, during the last ten years, links between the Com-
munity and a number of countries comprising 170 million inhabi-
tants and covering a surface area 14 times that of France, have 
been progressively forged, shrouded in the almost complete si-
lence of the press. Eleven agreements make up the structure of 
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this dialogue with the Mediterranean region for which" the Euro-
pean Community, a traditional commercial partner, offers vast de-
velopment possibilities. 
This polarization of Mediterranean countries towards Europe is 
explained by the fact that European realities are a basic factor in 
the growth models of the Mediterranean countries which cannot but 
integrate them in their development programmes. Being the only 
close partner enjoying a high level of income, the community con-
stitutes for these countries, the major element determining invest-
ment decisions. It is in fact practically the only customer for agri-
cultural products which make up the bulk of these countries' ex-
ports. It is worth noting that the amount of trade between the EEC 
and the Mediterranean is more or less equal to that between the 
EEC and the USA and three times that with Latin America. These 
facts only help to strengthen the argument for Europe's interest in 
the Mediterranean region. Moreover during the last ten years trade 
between the two areas has grown by a yearly average of about 10%. 
In 1973, the Community had formal relations with all the Medi-
terranean basin countries with the exception of Albania, Libya and 
Syria. As for Jordan negotiations are being undertaken for the sign-
ing of an agreement. It is generally agreed, though, that these ag-
reements make up a mosaic of limited agreements that lack homo-
geneity. However one must bear in mind that these agreements have 
been drawn with the objective of dealing with the different needs 
of the various Mediterranean countries themselves, within the con-
text of the Community's discretion that for legal and political rea-
sons is in practice limited only to trade matters. These bilateral 
agreements have been drawn after insistent requests by the" inte-
rested countries, with the Community acting rather passively and 
cautiously, case by case, dealing with the most pressing problems. 
Although seeming so limited, these links still have provided the 
necessary set-up within which a dialogue would be entered into to 
define the prevailing pr"oblems and freely dis"cuss possible future 
solutions. 
What is more significant is, that these agreements nave present-
ed a welcome opportunity to reconsider the relations between Eu-
rope and the Mediterranean and pave the way to eventual financial, 
industrial, technical and social co-operation. 
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n . . NATURE OF THE PROBLEM; INTERDEPENDENCE OF SoLUTIONS: 
It is, of course, true that the Mediterranean region is characteriz-
ed by considerable differences in the level of economic and social 
development and by contrasting political regimes, not to mention 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the Mediterranean there are countries 
that belong to the European Community, NATO and COMECON as 
well as countries with neutral tendencies. Still this sea which 
seems so divided represents also a community of problems. Most 
of these problems cannot be solved except in co-operation with the 
two Mediterranean countries that belong to the EEC i.e. France and 
Italy. But these two countries, by far the most important amongst 
those of the Mediterranean shores, are integrated within the politi-
co-economic structure of the European Community. 
Because of this the Europe of the Nine becomes, so to speak, 
altogether Mediterranean with all that this implies. Thus the Medi-
terranean's problems become Europe's problems. The link that 
joins the two is not only a determinate North-South one but the in-
terests of the two are woven together in a pattern of interdepen-
dence. This 'interdependence axis' concerns not solely strategic 
matters but also trade as well as migration of persons, energy sup-
plies, financial flows and ecological problems. 
Ca) The necessarily agricultural calling: 
The Mediterranean shores are typified by a common environment 
that is characterized by the similarity of climate and soil with com-
mon constraints of water shortage and erosion and limited plains 
of any appreciable size. These factors naturally lead to similarity 
in output and hence to intensive competition between the Mediter-
ranean countries of the North and those of the South, for both of 
which the market that represents the essential outlet is that of the 
Community. 
Thus the climatic conditions of this region, make about fifteen 
products that could be considered as typically Mediterranean (wine, 
olive oil, citrus, various fruits and vegetables) with production 
periods that are quite alike. These products barely manage to pro-
vide a living fo{ the mass of rural population, which ·in 'the Southern 
Mediterranean comprises two-thirds of the total population. More-
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over the population in these areas is expected to double by the end 
of this century. This mass of rural population, in itself, is a cause 
of an economic, social and political disequilibrium the actual im-
portance of which and the difficulties it would present in trying to 
adjust to it in the longer run, should not be under-estimated. 
The chance of finding employment for, and improving the lot of 
this section of the population rests at one and the same time on de-
velopments in agricultural production, on the shifting of an ever in-
creasing proportion of this population to expanding industrial or 
urban areas, and on emigration; each of these solutions, though, 
leads to numerous other complex problems. 
It should be realized, however, that any progress that can be at-
tained by improving, in arid areas, extensive and poor agriculture 
using man-power is no solution. Only intensive agriculture and 
hence essentially, horticulture, forestry or vineyards, and the pro-
cessing of their products can possibly provide the necessary em-
ployment and income to these rural masses, as long as it is impos-
sible to provide them with sufficient employment elsewhere. 
But which part of the world, except the European Community al-
ready and for a long time now the main market for these countries 
which provide it with 80% of its imports in these products, could 
ensure a significant outlet for these perishables that cannot be 
transported over too long a distance? 
This situation would not have given rise to any difficulties, were 
it not for the fact that these products signify a threat to similar 
products coming from the less favoured regions of France and Italy. 
The Latin members of the Community had put as a condition for 
their membership the adoption of an agricultural policy which has 
seriously limited foreign competition. Thus the Mediterranean pro-
ducers are themselves faced with .an obstacle which only the Euro-
pean Community could remove. 
Th.e Southern Community countries should however realise that 
they are the principa.l beneficaries from the development of trade in 
industrial products in the Mediterranean. They should also realise 
that for various products (particularly tomatoes, cucumbers and on-
ions) the most formidable competitors lie in Northern Europe, and 
especially in the Netherlands, where intensive cultivation under 
glass houses is organised on a continental basis. 
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For their part the Northern countries of the Community are gene-
rally more concerned about the interests of their consumers than 
about an agriculture which does not really belong to them. They 
are mainly concerned lest they would have to support, on the finan-
cial level, the consequences of a Mediterranean Policy, which 
would consist of aid to Community agriculture or aid to Mediterra-
nean countries. 
(b) Industrial Development: in search of Investors and Markets 
Industrial development in the Mediterranean is characterised by 
the existence of considerable differences which range from the 
more advanced industrial economies like Spain and Israel to the 
underdeveloped, areas of the Tunisian type. If one were to add to 
the former two countries, Yugoslavia, Greece and Portugal, the list 
of countries exporting a certain, or rather an important volume, of 
industrial products would be complete. For the rest, except for hy-
drocarbons, exports are minimal. 
However industry is a sector which provides better chances of 
growth than in agriculture. Its progress could help these countries 
to diversify their economies, reduce unemployment and expand 
those resources which are necessary for their development. But, in 
spite of the natural advantages that certain Mediterranean countr-
ies have, for producing goods that require high energy and labour 
inputs, and for those requiring harbour facilities where costs are 
relatively low in this region of inlets, important difficulties still 
prevail. Inefficient administrative and technological framework and 
political instability reduce the worth of economic and climatic ad-
vantages. 
Currently, in fact, save for the more industrialized countries of 
the region, one can claim that the more attainable economic chanc-
es for the less industrialized countries lie in those sectors for 
_which. obstacles of access to the market of the Community are 
known. This is the case of textile products, refined petroleum pro-
ducts and food products. 
A further consideration, already mentioned, is the fact that the 
Community, because of its geographical proximity and market size 
constitutes the major economic factor for the region, in as much as, 
it strongly conditions its development. In short, if the Community 
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sneezes, the Mediterranean catches a cold .•. 1 
The Mediterranean was by passed by the industrial revolution of 
the 19th century, based as it was on techniques for which these 
countries were not gifted (blast furnaces, steam powered machine-
ry, railway). These countries have little coal, their metal deposites 
were known and exploited by the Romans, and were left practically 
without any of the classical ores. Geographical features did not 
help the installation of railways and navigation; the latter was 
practically confined to the oceans before the opening of the Suez 
Canal. 
Conditions have now changed. Technological evolution has put 
an end to dependence on coal. The Mediterranean, on its Southern 
shores, possesses oil and natural gas resources or is the place of 
transit, eventually also of rifining of petroleum products. 
Throughout the world we witness a tendency to locate industries 
in harbour areas (which are plentiful in the Mediterranean). So far 
it has been mainly the European regions of the northwest of the 
Mediterranean that have, at least partially, bene fitted from this 
process of Mediterranean 'Renaissance'. On the contrary, the 
countries of the South and East; although neither are entirely lack-
ing resources, require foreign assistance in order to finance their. 
industrialization, based on basic industries (based on natural gas, 
petroleum, iron and steel) or on transformation industries. 
The conditions seem to be ripe for an economic evolution of the 
whole Mediterranean industry between its dual fronts, with a trans-
fer of factors of production between a hyperconcentrated industrial 
Europe using 8 million Mediterranean migrant workers (Italians in-
cluded) and the whole of the Mediterranean in search of an econo-
mic renaissance. 
(c) Migrant Workers or the 10th Community Country 
On the Mediterranean shores the employment problem is distres-
sing. Subject to a demographic pressure bordering on a growth rate 
of 3% per annum the southern shores alone can reckon on 200 mil-
lion inhabitants by the end of the century. 
The cumulative effect of Mediterranean underdevelopment and 
lSee the annexes concerning trade between the EEC and the Mediterra-
nean. 
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the rapid economic expansion of Europe organized within the Com-
mon Market, has provoked particularly in the last ten years, one of 
the greatest migrations of modern times. During this period it has 
become ever more clear that immigration has lost its conjunctive 
feature to become a structural element in our present economic sys-
tem. The traditional place of Italy as 'a reservoir of labour' has 
come to be shared by Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Maghreb. 
It is true that the countries of origin benefit from the remittances 
of their migrant workers (a contribution that for certain Mediterra-
nean countries could surpass the earnings from trade) and provides 
a certain relief on the employment market due to the reduction of 
unemployment. But it is also true that these regions are losing the 
youngest and most dynamic elements hence an aging population re-
sults with the consequent reduction of production capabilities. 
This massive drain on the lively forces of the population risks, in 
the end to accelerate, instead of undoing, the underdevelopment 
spiral. Moreover these imigrant workers, in most cases after having 
gi ven to Europe the best years of their li ves, do not succeed in in-
tegrating with a society that rej ects them, and return home to con-
stitute a heavy burden for social security and retirement funds. 
Migrant workers and their families within the enlarged Commu-
nity constitute, the 10th non-member 'state' of the latter, a 'state' 
the population of which in 1973 was about eight million inhabi-
tants. This 'country' it goes without saying, has no domicilial 
rights in the Common Market. It is a 'nation' of second class citi-
zens forming a category of sub-proletarians often without any gua-
rantee of employment and subject to fluctuations in economic con-
ditions. It is a 'nation' with diminished or even inexistant rights 
which however constitute an ever more important part of the active 
population of Europe. Whole sectors of the economy are to-day de-
pendent on immigrant labour. Sectors where the European no longer 
wants to be subjected to the slavery of the industrial civilization: 
building, production and working of metals, mechanical industry. 
The Community is thus tied to and a beneficiary of, this flux of 
Mediterranean labour, the more so gi ven that our demographic growth 
tends to stagnate. This human interdependence has developed a-
long a 'South-North' axis in the prevailing interest of European 
opulence of the industrial triangle and has been integrated in the 
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growth formula of the Common Market as a necessary constant. 
(d) From environment to Oil 
The three aspects briefly analysed agriculture, industry and la-
bour are at the same time common problems for the Mediterranean 
region and the Community, a fabric of interconnections, I dare say 
unique at world level, to which should be added that of de fense 
and environment. The ecological interdependence in actual fact 
concerns all the countries on the shores of this enormous lake 
where life risks disappearing if the Northern countries export their 
polluting industries to the other side of the sea in the name of 
growth. An initial conclusion can thus be partially derived: if the 
hypothesis of a co-operation option between Europe and the Medi-
terranean is fully accepted, the solution to these problems cannot 
be found except in common. 
Moreover one should not forget an important complementary ele-
ment: the tourist phenomena through which the European depen-
dence vis-a-vis the sun corresponds to the dependence of the Me-
diterranean countries on the revenue generated. These transfers 
have grown during the last ten years on the average at an annual 
rate greater than 15% for the whole of the 'sunny countries' and, 
exceeded the remittan ces of migran t workers, to become second in 
rank, after physical exports, in the total of foreign receipts of the 
region. To be sure, tourist activities can very easily do without in-
tervention resulting from co-operation agreements but this would be 
an error of under-estimating the importance of this element not sole-
ly from the point of view of development but also as a means of 
bringing people together. 
If we now take into consideration the energy problems solely for 
the countries of the Mediterranean shores, it would be inaccurate 
to speak of interdependence with Europe, with the only exception 
of Algeria and Libya. It is true however that the Mediterranean 
controls the access to Middle Eastern oil that comes through 'pipe-
line' in the eastern region or by 'tanker' through the straits of Gib-
raltar. And Europe depends almost entirely on external supplies, of 
which two thirds pass through the Mediterranean. Hence one can 
easily imagine the economic and strategic importance that this re-
gion represents: a serious and prolonged crisis could cause a pa-
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ral y sis of European industry. 2 
These few considerations are but a few examples, the more im-
portant, that show the returns that co-operation between Europe and 
the Mediterranean can offer. The Mediterranean countries have come 
to realise in isolation the importance which represents, for each of 
them, the big European partner and the problems that it poses for 
them. The Community, on its side, has only slowly discovered the 
extent of its ties. In elaborating the whole aggregate statistics, it 
has better evaluated the importance of its trade with a region which 
it has had the tendency, even in the recent past, to consider as 
having mainly importance from the point of view of security and of 
maintaining traditional relations. 
III. THE CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE COUNTR-
IES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN. 
Mediterranean is a term which does not occur at all in the Rome 
Treaty, as an ordinary provision to define particular relations wi th 
the whole group of countries of this region. It is only in the decla-
rations annexed to the Treaty that there is provision for the pos-
si ble association of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, coun tries that 
have had particular relations with European States; a relic of the 
colonial past of France and Italy. Algeria was not placed in an an-
nexed protocol: at the time of the birth of the European Community 
it still formed part of the Metropolitan French territory ••• 
The Treaty instituting the EEC however provides juridical 
means whereby it is possible to enter into agreements. This con-
cerns mainly article ,113 concerning a Common Commercial Policy! 
add article 238 that authorizes the Community to conclude associa-
tion agreements. 
It is on this basis that the Community has taken its first steps 
. towards a Mediterranean Policy with all the constraints deriving 
from a lack of a political concept and worse s.ti11 lack of common 
strategy, not to speak of the failure of economic organization on 
2This point has been proved by the crisis brought about by the Arab oil 
embargo after the October war in the Middle East: Trans lator' s note. 
3Commercial relations, prior to the end of the transitory stage were based 
on Article 111. 
109 
European territory. In this regard, it. must be recalled that the ag-
reements with Greece and Turkey were signed respectively in 1961 
and 1963 when the organization of agricultural markets had hardly 
been started. Consequently a number of major difficulties had to be 
faced, when searching for a guiding line leading to the Mediterra-
nean countries in absence of policies as important as energy, in-
dustrial, social and regional, not to mention agricultural policy 
that only now comes to be drawn for processed agricultural pro-
ducts. 
These factors have made the Community act in a pragmatic way 
rather than follow a specific and global policy in respect of the 
various countries and products. In fact this latter approach would 
have divided the member states and would have impeded response 
to the pr.essing initiatives of certain Meditenanean countries that 
justifiably believed, that they were paying for an integration in 
which they did not participate. Moreover in view of the antagonism 
between the super powers, becoming ever more acute proportionally 
with the degree of penetration of the Soviets in the Mediterranean, it 
was not at all strange that they get closer to a partner whose es-
sential virtues were a certain lack of political activity and an eco-
nomic importance that made it the biggest commercial world power. 
The fact that Great Britain had decided to join the Common Market 
has meant for the Mediterranean partners a favourable complemen-
taty forecast of a process of integration and growth that will take 
place at the level of the Old Continent. 
In such circumstances, the Community was seen as constrained 
to act in order to reduce the difficulties that it had itself created 
for its Mediterranean partners particularly in the agricultural sec-
tor. Economic necessities were to determine the choice which, ten 
years later, could be considered as the first outline of a foreign 
policy. 
These relations between the Community and the Mediterranean 
region have developed in three distinct phases: 
- That of initi alion, characterized by the Association Agreements 
with Greece and Turkey, took place between 1961 and 1963, along 
with the beginings of the EEC; 
that of proliferation, which covered the period between 1961 
and 1972 characterized by the association of Tunisia, Morocco, 
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Malta and Cyprus; trade agreements with Spain, Israel, Lebanon, 
Egypt besides the non-preferential trade agreement with Yugoslav-
ia; to these we can add the agreement negotiated with Portugal in 
the context of relations with the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA); 
- that of the global approach, the beginning of which came in 
July 1973 with the opening of negotiations with Israel, Spain, Al-
geria, Tunesia, and Morocco. 
To facilitate reading we felt we shall not elaborate on the speci-
fic contents of each agreement even in their broad outline. 4 On the 
contrary, we shall attempt to make a brief analysis of the reasons 
motivating the agreements and, where appropriate, of the underlying 
politics that probably led to certain choices. In fact one can easily 
agree on the economic motives already underlined, outcomes of 
factors or dictates of interdependence of which we have already 
spoken. On the contrary, if one wants to de lve into the political 
motives, that are never defined openly by those responsible in the 
Mediterranean countries and in the member states. of the Communi-
ty, one must confine oneself to personal and hence.subjective im-
pressions. But perhaps this effort might on reflection be suggestive 
to those who try to understand that which could be hidden behind 
an image of pure technicality. 
(a) Greece and Turkey, the initiation phase. 
The first two agreements of the Communiry were those of Athens 
and Ankara, negotiated and signed in the early sixties, that is in 
an historical context of escalating cold war and soviet penetration 
that gave rise to serious fears on both sides of the Atlantic. On 
one hand, an association agreement would have 'stabilized' the 
economic and political structures of Greece which is a member of 
NATO just like the member states of the EEC. On the other, the 
conservative Government of Mr. Karamanlis sought a prestigious 
success to try and block the mounting liberal tendencies of Mr. P a-
pandreou who was endangering his Government and over whom 
therefore he had to prevail. A success in the association negotia-
tions with Europe in fact reassured the image of the conservative 
4 c .f. in annex· the schematic contents of the agreements signed between 
the EEC and the Mediterranean countries (position: 1st. July 1973.) 
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Government. Lastly, the failure of the first negotations between 
the EEC and Great Britain, urged France to enlargement in the 
South, perhaps to prove to its partners a spirit of outward looking-
ness where 'Hellade' replaced 'Albion'. 
Similar motives could be traced at the roots of the Association 
Agreement signed with Turkey in 1963. In fact, the Southern flank 
of the NATO security network does not stop at the cradle of the 
first democracy, but extends further beyond the Bosphorus, into 
the Asian continent. On its side, Turkey, faithful to the historical 
choice of Ataturk, wished to consolidate its political and economic. 
ties with a Europe that desired a balanced approach towards two 
countries divided by a most acient rivalry. 
Treating of two countries with a vocation of integrating with the 
Community, the two association agreements were signed as an ini-
tial preparation for a consequent adhesion wi th the EEC. This ex-
plains the outcome, particularly in the case of the Greek agreement: 
a formidable legal construction tailored on the Treaty of Rome, ex-
tending over a quarter of century and which describes in advance 
the meticulous mechanisms that ought to lead progressively to a 
customs union. The text is thus littered with precise timetables 
and detailed schedules which, even if in theory they allow for all 
the technical aspects, ignore the political element and could not 
forecast what the outcome would be in reality. The proof of this 
came with the coup d'etat of the Greek colonels in 1967 after which 
this beautiful legal monument which was the Athen s Agreement was 
frozen. 
This lesson has borne its fruits. Consequendy, the Community 
has signed association or preferential trade agreements on the bas-
is of discreet stages, progressively determined, which are. better 
equipped to deal with a world experiencing rapid changes. 
(b) The proliferation phase: Ten agreements in four years 
The Greek experience must have been kept in the minds of the 
negotiators who signed the agreement with Spain in 1970. The lat-
ter had requested an association to show its people that Europe 
. had accepted its political system, but the result was a simple pre-
ferential agreement of limited duration. The Athens lesson had 
served its purpose and only the assurance of ability to decide 
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afresh and in function of the results of the previous stage of the 
agreement persuaded the more cautious of the member states to ex-
tend ComrI"unity contractual relations to the I~beria~ peninsula. 
As for Malta the problems were quite different, since the relevant 
motivations of sheer national politics, and the economic impor-
ance, were insignificant for the Community. On the side of the Mal-
tese, the association agreement signed towards the ,~nd of 1970 
was meant to consolidate the European vocation of the island and 
reassure the declining prestiege of Mr. Borg Olivier, the conserva-
tive leader whose name will always be connected with the attain-
ment of independence of the island. The success of the negotia-
tions did not however hinder the electoral victQry of Dom Mintoff a 
few months later. The six, on the other hand, sought a strategic in-
terest in the association of this little Commonwealth country: a 
transfer of Malta to soviet flanks would have altered the Mediterra-
nean equilibrium. 
The case of Cyprus, that signed an association agreement in 
1972 is not fundamentally different from the previous one. Apart 
strategic matters, it was important for these two countries not to 
keep away from a Community to which Great Britain was seeking to 
adhere. 
The preferential trade agreement signed by the EEC and Portugal 
in 1972 could be compared, as to its political considerations, to 
that of Spain. However we note twO details of different nature: this 
country is not strictly speaking Mediterranean but c'an be consider-
ed as belonging to this region because of similar environmental 
features; negotiations took place in the context of the agreements 
with EFTA as a consequence of Community enlargement. 
Finally, to conclude with the tEuropean' eountries, Yugoslavia 
signed a non-preferential trade agreement with the community in 
1970, which was replaced in 1973 by a further agreement of a wid-
er scope. This agreement reconciles a desire for economic tap-
proachment' with the need, due to the Yugoslav set-up to organize 
its trade relations within a non-preferential framework. 
If we pass to the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, none of 
the agreements drawn lead, eventually, to adhesion with the Com-
munity. This is a limitation put by the Treaty of Rome which ex-
tends full participation in the Community only to European countr-
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ies. The association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco, sign-
ed in 1969, are the result of commitments undertaken by the signa-
tories of the Rome Treaty as a consequence of the existing special 
relations between these countries and France with whom they en-
joyed a privileged treatment, particularly for their principal ex-
ports: agricultural products. Just like with the case of Algeria with 
whom no agreement has been signed by the Community so far, the 
interdependent relations were such that it was necessary to search 
for a new equilibrium with the Six. Moreover, the Maghreb countries 
ha ve resented, in different periods, the precantious nature of their 
links with Paris. Europe could allow a redefinition of these links 
without directly destroying their bilateral nature. The Tunis and 
Rabat agreements have indirectly played an important role in the 
relations between the Community and Mediterranean countries: their 
example has probably urged other Arab States to establish contact 
with the EEC, the more so since the latter had signed an agreement 
with Israel already in 1963. 
To be sure, Israel was the country most pressed to establish 
close links with the EEC in order to come out of its isolation. A 
request for association was submitted in 1959: a minor non-prefe-
rential trade agreement, was the outcome in 1963. This was follow-
ed by a preferential trade agreement, signed in 1970. 
In answer to the Lebanese requests, but also in order to estab-
lish parallel and comparable relations with the various Middle Eas-
tern countries, the Community in 1965 concluded, an agreement co-
vering trade (similar to the one signed with Israel) and technical 
co-operation with Lebanon. A preferential trade agreement was sign-
ed by the latter and the EECin 1972 concurrently with a preferent-
ial trade agreement signed with Egypt. Only the search of pragma-
tism has made it possible for the Community to allow the pursual of 
a boycott (by the Arabs) and the safe-guarding of non-discrimina-
tion amongst constituted bodies and nationals of the Contracting 
parties. This has made it possible to follow a tight timetable in ne-
gotarions between the Community and Israel on one hand and with 
Egypt and Lebanon on the other. 
(c) Agreements viewed 'horizontally': Similarties and differences 
As we have pointed out earlier on, the Community, within the li-
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mited fields of action due to institutional, political and economic 
reasons has in defining the first outlines of a Mediterranean policy 
sought to find a pragmatic set of approaches and solutions more or 
less homogeneous. The objectives were a contribution to peace, 
security, economic equilibrium and political stability of the region 
- ambitious obj ectives if one were to realize that the means were 
limited to the progressive establishment of custom unions and free 
trade areas. 
These agreements though limited, do cover an important part of 
trade, constituting an appreciable reduction in quotas and tariffs 
and a first important step towards the free exchange of goods. They 
are based on the notion of an equilibrium in the agricultural sector, 
(that is the stabilization of export receipts of the Mediterranean 
partners on the Community market which is very sentitive to com-
petition in this sector) and of expansion in the industrial sector 
where the degree of European sensitivity is much -less in view of 
the export potential of the region. 
Besides, these preferential relations are based on the principle 
of reciprocity in the concessions given. This is the cause of vio-
lent criticism from across the Atlantic. 
At the legal level, only the agreements with Greece5 and Turkey 
went beyond the purely commercial context and were extended to 
other areas and particularly to financial aid. Because of this, in so 
far as they are wide agreements and fall under the jurisdiction of 
both the Community (tariff provisions) and the member states as 
such (financial provisions) they had to be submitted for ratification 
to the national parliaments. 
They are furthermore characterized by rather wide powers of de-
cision t~king of which the institutional organs responsible for su-
pervising the application of the agreements (Association Council 
and Committee) dispose; powers which are not to be found in ar-
rangements with other countries of the region. 
5Since the coup d'etat of 1967, the scope of the Athens Agreement is li-
mited to the barest essentials. Hence all developments have been blocked 
both on financ ial and trade aspects. 
Translator's note: after the Cyprus crisis (July 1974) and the eventual 
toppling of the Colonne Is' regime in Greece, normalization of re lations 
with the EEC are possible. 
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The other agreements differ in their legal basis for political and 
historical reasons, but still they are pretty identical in their set-up 
and duration (limited duration of a first stage of about fi ve years; 
basically identical framework and general and institutional provi-
sion; scope limited solely to trade matters; similar rules of origin.) 
The first table of the annex gives an outline of the legal nature 
and the duration of the first stage of agreements between the Com-
munity and the Mediterranean. A more detailed synopsis of the con-
tents of these agreements is given in other tables of the annex. 
We ask the reader to notice the schematic presentation of agree-
ments in what concerns expiry (the renegotiations in principle start 
18 months before the existing arrangements come to an end). This 
treats of a temporary horizon which should signify the entry into 
the first phase of EEC-Mediterranean relations and the 'deepening' 
of these links, in order to go beyond the purely trade field to 
which the Community has limited itself due to a lack of legal in-
struments and of a political will of the member states. In fact, at a 
time when tariffs are becoming less and less protective and after 
the introduction in July 1971 of the Generalized Scheme of Prefe-
rences benefitting the developing countries one can hardly envisage 
how the Mediterranean approach can be simply based on tariff pre-
ferneces. It is clear that not even a total liberalization of trade 
would suffice to resolve the grave economic development problems 
of the region. Time was ripe for a new phase in European - Medi-
terranean relations. 
After a horizontal assessment of the agreements from the legal 
point of view, we shall try a short analysis from the commercial and 
tariff point of view. 6 
On this level there exist no important differences between the 
various agreements in so far as the amount of tariff concessions 
are concerned (to the sole exception already noted i.e. the case of 
the Athens Agreement.). 
In the industrial sector, the concessions requested by the Com-
munity are purposely disproportionately in favour of the Mediterra-
nean countries in order to account for the vulnerability of their eco-
nomies and often one gets the impression that the EEC is not inte-
6 c.f. the annex on the contents of the agreement quoted above. 
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rested in the real economic significance of the counterpart to ask 
from its partners. On its side the Community has tended to under-
take a substantial tariff reduction in respect of its imports coming 
from the Mediterranean, with limited exceptions for its sensible 
products. 
In the agricultural sector, the objective was to preserve the 
trade flows, to respect Community interests and preference, giving 
specific concessions in principle based on the notion of a balance 
in the interests of the Mediterranean countries. The difference 
which one can claim in the number and kind of products being the 
object of the concessions given by the Community in the various 
agreements lies in the diverging interests of the partners defined 
as a function of their production and commercialization of outpUt. 
It is thus due to such interests that concessions have been includ-
ed in some agreements but not in others. Moreover, motivations due 
to divergent interests of member states, in certain cases, have re-
sulted in disparities in the directives given by the Council of Mi-
nisters to the Commission, which plays the role of negotiator: 
these differences have been reflected by concessions of different 
content in the agreements signed. 
A last word is due on the tatiff content of these agreements and 
their conformity with GATT provisions, questions which are strong-
ly debated by opponents of the Mediterranean links of the Commu-
nity particularly the U.S. This dispute is based on the argument 
that the multiplication of preferential agreements and the growing 
volume of trade thus concerned brings in question the most favour-
ed nation clause, the basic rule of international trade. The evolu-
tion thus underraken would lead to a world division into large 
spheres of influence and risks harming political and economic inte-
rests of GATT Contracting Parries and most especially the less 
developed ones. 
On top of this criticism of a more general nature, is placed a 
further criticism of the Mediterrane~an agreements for not respecting 
to the letter the spirit of article XXIV of GATT that provides for a 
derogation from the principle of the most favoured nation; the crea-
tion of customs unions or free trade areas. According to the promo-
ters of this argument, these exceptions are not possible between 
countries enj oying different level of economic development and the 
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exceptions would not cater adequately to the development needs of 
these countries. Now, it is clearly seen that the Mediterranean ag-
reements do fit in the context that conforms to Art. XXIV in so far 
as they envisage as the ultimate objective the creation of customs 
unions and free trade areas. If a plan and a precise programme to 
arrive there have not yet been minutely specified, this is due to 
the impossibility of defining here and now, in all detail, all the 
stages of co-operation with partners with an economic and indust-
rial structure so different. My personal impression is that this 
treats of a fake problem, invoked at random for reasons which 
have nothing to do with international trade rules. Reciprocity might 
well not have been requested from less developed partners and it 
has not been proved that trade liberalization within a regional 
framework has any negative effects on international trade. 
Rather than playing hide-and-seek behind the GATT article it 
seems to me that, it would be more in place, to adapt the Geneva 
institution to the new situation prevailing thirty years after its 
birth. 
IV. COMMUNITY ENLARGEMENT - OPPORTUNITY AND REASON FOR A NEW 
APPROACH TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
Although the outcome of the first stage of EEC-Mediterranean re-
lations has not been negligible, this has been 'realized' by the 
partners of the region rather in the way of hope and a promise than 
by any effective and decisive action. And this has been particular-
ly true in what concerns their principal exports which are agricul-
tural and for which the concessions given in the agreements have 
been lowest due to their con petition with similar production in the 
Community. 
But, for certain Mediterranean countries, Great Britain figured as 
a safety valve in a large buyers' market, with very low tariffs, some-
times nil, for the various fruits and vegetables, as well as proces-
sed agricultural products. 
(a) Enlargement of the Community 
An effect of the enlargement of the Community was the obligation 
for the new members to accept the 'acquis communautaire' in the 
case of the existing agreements between the EEC and the Mediter-
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ranean. 7 If the 'acquisition' of this dozen or so agreements did not 
present any economic difficulty for Denmark, Great Britain and Ire-
land the situation was all so different, and often very serious, for 
Mediterranean countries. It was particularly the case with Spain 
and Israel who saw their traditional trade flows, made up of fresh 
and preserved agricultural products, very soon confronted by the 
Common Agricultural Policy which so far had been averted by pass-
sing through the English Channel. Besides, the introduction of the 
Generalized Preference Scheme, the setting up of a free trade area 
with the EFT A non-member countries of the Community and the 
geographic extension of association to African countries, would un-
doubtedly disfavour the commercial position of Mediterranean 
countries vis-a-vis the enlarged EEC. 
These were not unfounded fears in so far as the effect has been 
to cause a deterioration in the internal equilibrium due to enlarge-
ment. The most evident cases were those of Spain and Israel where 
the 'average' for the agricultural sector have changed respectively 
from 59% and 79% (Six) to 46% and 62% (Nine) due to enlargement, 
and often it treated of exports which had been developed in func-
tion of the requirements ef the U.K. market. 
During close contacts between the Community and its Mediterra-
nean partners which had taken place during spring/summer 1971, 
the latter had shown a strong political interest in the enlargement 
of the EEC and had reaffirmed their desire for a close co-operation 
underlining though, sometimes very forcefully, the economic risks 
that the change would carry for them. 
The community. requests were thus bent to search for a solution, 
both in the agricultural as well as in the industrial sector, aimed 
at attaining a balance of agreements and avoiding serious conse-
quences for the Mediterranean countries. To this affect, the Com-
mission had proposed, end 1971, to give tariff concessions to these 
countries in order to compensate them for the effects of enlarge-
ment. This treated of corrective measures within the existing ag-
reements; these would not be subject to change either in their es-
sence or duration. The ensuing discussions led to a deadlock when 
the negative attitudes taken by the member states were heaped on 
7 Article 108 of the Treaty of Adhesion. 
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the Commission proposals of a 'product by product' approach. Eight 
months thus passed by, with documents moving at the frustrating 
rhythm of the Community procedural 'shuttles', a 'come and go' bet-
ween experts - ambassadors - ministers. At the door, knocking, 
were the Mediterranean countries, who knew the difficulties of the 
EEC member states, but who where disappointed of the generosity 
of the largest commercial group of the world. 
This Gordian knot of sophism, conferences, tariffs and quotas 
provoked the reaction of the European Parliament which requested 
'to lead to a common political initiative on the basis of a coherent 
overall attitude aimed particularly at promoting development policy 
and using means better adapted than simple trade measure'. 8 This 
has been an option often desired by the Commission. 
A magic word: 'global approach' pronounced by the French minis-
ter Maurice Schuman in the summer of 1972 was to set the Commu-
nity on a new path. It was the end of the deadlock: the problem s 
posed by enlargement were to be solved by an anticipated renego-
tiation of the various agreements according to a global and balanc-
ed approach in the Mediterranean. End September 1972, the Com-
mission put forward its proposals accepted in principle by the 
Council: the progressive establishment of free trade between the 
Community and each of the Mediterranean countries that were will-
ing to undertake it, the introdu.ction of forms of economic and finan-
cial co-operation. 
This attitude satisfied the Mediterranean partners who accepted 
the negotiations of additional protocols 9 adapting the existing ag-
reements to the enlarged Community in expectation of new agree-
ment to be negotiated along new lines. 
The idea of an overall policy, extending over the globality of 
problems, at least of the economic ones, existing between Europe 
and the Mediterranean countries is not new. This was in fact the 
subject of a memorandum presented by Italy to the Council of Mi-
nisters in 1964; it. is to be found in several debates and resolutions 
of the European Parliament,10 in speeches of both European and 
8 Rossi Report - Doe. 246 of the Europe an Par! iament (1971). 
9 c •f• in annex the position on 1st July 1973. 
10 Resolution following the Rossi Report (Dec. 302/72 of 28/2/72) 
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Mediterranean statesmen, as well as those of members of the Euro-
pean Commission. 
It was in the order of things to translate these desires in terms 
of a political choice, but the Community seems to have been too 
involved with its own process of enlargement to bother with the 
Mediterranean as well. But the effects of this move towards integ-
ration in the Mediterranean region and the reaction of these countr-
ies have led to, after the limited efforts already described, taking 
a step towards what Maurice Schumann had defined: 'The global ap-
proach'. Also the Paris Summit of October 1972 was to confirm, in 
point 11 of the final communique, that it attaches 'an essential im-
portance to the fulfilment of its commitments with the countries of 
the Mediterranean basin, with whom agreements have been signed 
or about to be signed, agreements which ·should be the subj ect of a 
global and balanced approach.' 
Meanwhile the European Commission of Mr. Mansholt did not have 
to be coaxed to formulate into proposals this concept of global ap-
proach, which for some was rather nebulous. The 27 September 
1972 was the occasion for clearly establishing, on the internal and 
external level of the Community, the Euro-Mediterranean relations 
taken from evidently dissimilar agreements that had posed growing 
problems to the membel' states, both in the relations with internal 
pressure groups, as well as with important third countries and at 
GATT without furthermore effectively contributing to the develop· 
ment of the region. 
The proposals of the Commission seemed to start off by a preli-
minary examination of conscience: only a Community which 'would 
have realized a substantial progress in its own 'approfondissement', 
would be capable of defining a Mediterranean Policy to a degree of 
its responsibility. Now, the EEC in 1973, does not have at its dis-
posal common policies in energy, industrial and social matters not 
to speak of an economic and financial policy. Basing proposals on 
inexistent policies or which are just about coming into existance 
is wishful thinking: the result of which would be a book of Mediter-
ranean dreams. 
The approach has thus been more modest, in bringing down a 
utopian globality to specific problems that is advisable to deal 
with in the near future. The first problem is to attian a realization 
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of free trade for the essential trade flow thus the first phase is in-
cluded in the already existing agreements. This liberalization 
should function within the framework of customs unions for the Eu-
ropean countries whose political and economic set-up would permit 
the possibility of a progressive integration with the Community, for 
the others, within the framework of a free trade area. 
For industrial products from the side of the Community, the pro-
gressive elimination of obstacles to trade is envisaged in principle 
for the 1st July 1977. For the Mediterranean partners, their lag in 
removal of obstacles to trade will be more or less long depending 
on their level of development besides their ability to compete. 
For agricultural products, the Commission proposes liberalization 
of trade for 80% of the agricultural exports of each of the Mediterra-
nean partners with only partial reductions (from 40% to 60%) of Com-
mon Customs Tariff. This restrictive approach, which is added on 
to the establishment of calendars (timetables) for imports, is justi-
fied by the similarity of products which leads to very strong compe-
tition between Mediterranean and Community products. All supple-
mentary concessions cannot become operative except after periodi-
cal 'meetings' between the contracting parties aimed at studying 
the evolution of trade in the area concerned. 
But, free trade, comprising agricultural products, would not be 
sufficient on its own to ensure stability and economic development 
in this area. Commercial agreements no matter their nature cannot 
but be based on the status quo of production and do not therefore, 
in themselves contain any essential element favouring development. 
The Commission thus is of the opinion that the restructuring of its 
Mediterranean Policy should also contain contractual co-operation 
including coherent measures regarding capital movement, financial 
and technical aid, technology, employment and protection of the en-
vironment. 
Bearing in mind the elements of interdependence which characte-
rize oil, on one hand for security of supply of Community energy, 
and, on the other, for the economic and social development of the 
Mediterranean basin countries, a Community Policy in respect of 
this region should not be separate from co-operation in this sector 
according to the Commission. 
The necessary hinge for the above proposals is considered by 
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the Commission to be putting in dock a co-operation policy in the 
financial, technical, employment and environment sectors. But the 
approach should be flexible and progressive. During the critical 
launching period Community aid would be given according to the 
usual schemes and measures by member states, aids by other 
countries or multilateral organizations given to Mediterranean ba-
sin countries are maintained; beyond search for possibilities that 
would permit attaining a progressive concentration for development 
action for the whole of the Mediterranean basin would take place. 
Without hesitation the Commission has proposed that the Communi-
ty would immediately undertake common co-operation initiatives in 
the economic, industrial and financial sector to encourage regional 
groupings, facilitate sectoral development on the basis of devision 
of labour and scientific and technological co-operation. 
Within the framework of this general co-operation, the following 
group of measures would be given priority: 
- technical co-operation should complement economic co-opera-
tion in the various areas. The Community would contribute, as a 
first priority, to the training of men, besides to the study of prob-
lems and projects to be introduced. It is worth underlining at this 
stage the importance of the needs, already noted in this context re-
garding the study of markets and those directly linked to specific 
industrial proj ects. 
- financial co-operation would be given. In certain cases it is in-
dispensible in the form of normal loans, loans on special terms, or 
grants, with the objective, on the one hand, to support development 
effort of the least advanced countries having the least appropriate 
resources to finance their action in complemeflting their capital 
availability, and, on the other, to help to put in place the necessary 
investment to materialize efforts aimed at regional co-operation. 
These two forms of co-operation would be offered only to the less 
developed countries of the Mediterranean basin countries starting 
with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Malta. 
- co-operatidn in the employment sector should also be included 
in the global approach. It would have as an objective the improve-
ment of the conditions of reception, stay and employment of the 
workers employed in the Community. This would, in principle, be 
extended to all the interested countries. 
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It treats mainly, on one side, of the establishment of non-discri-
mination in matters concerned with conditions of work, wages, and 
social provisions, and, on the other, of contributing to the profes-
sional formation, prior to emigration, facilitiating social mobility 
during the period of work in the Co mmunity afterwards, and permit-
ting the stabilization of capacity for work in view of the worker's 
eventual return to his country of origin. 
The ecological unity of the Mediterranean and the opportunit:y of 
avoiding the creation of obstacles to trade that could inhibit the de-
velopment of economic co-operation that one envisages being es-
tablished necessitates that co-operation in matters of protection of 
the enviomment would equally form part of the global approach. This 
would particularly permit to respond by an equitable sharing out of 
the expenses, aimed at eliminating pollution in the Mediterranean 
which is in the coverging long term interest of all the bordering 
countries. 
The propositions of the Commission concerned all the Mediterra-
nean basin countries to the exception of Greece and Turkey, count-
ries associated to the Community and destined, if political condi-
tions and the evolution of economic structure would permit, to ad-
here one day to the EEC. Among the other countries, a priority has 
been given to Spain and Israel, the countries most hurt by the en-
largement of the Community (see above), the Maghreb countries (the 
agreements with Tunisia and Morocco are about to come to an end) 
and Malta to which renegotiations have been promised as soon as 
possible. 
These new agreements should come into effect on 1st July 1974, 
at the time when the new member states, would start aligning their 
external tariff to the Common External tariff. 
(c) Council of Ministers decisions on the Global Approach 
The Commission propositions have been discussed for nlne 
months by the European Ministers, their experts and Commission 
teams. What is at stake is important because the global orientations 
of relations between Europe and the Mediterranean would meet the 
opposition, concealed or explicit, of the most of the large third 
countries and because the new member states are showing some he-
sitation in accepting the 'regionalistic' approach characterising the 
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legal commitments already undertaken by the original Community 
with the countries of this region. Furthermore, the introduction of 
forms of co-operation signifying in the very short term a financial 
participation of unknown proportions would come up in the -same 
time period when an important effort is being envisaged for a reno-
vation of the convention linking the EEC to the French speaking 
countries to which the countries of the 'black Commonwealth' will 
be added. Finally, the Commission proposals, envisaging free trade 
for industrial products and important concessions for agricultural 
goods would not fail from arousing fears and reactions from the less 
developed regions of Europe, which are afraid of having to pay the 
price for this operation. 
But already in November 1972, the Council of Ministers accepted 
as a basis for further work the Commission proposals. End June 
1973 the first directives for negotiations were given and thus per-
mitted the opening of negotiations with Spain, Israel and the Magh-
reb countries. Thus the Commission proposals have been retained 
in principle: relations with the Mediterranean countries must be 
brought out of the 'trade ghetto' which had characterised the past 
experience. The Global Approach has thus been defined under three 
sub-headings: the commercial one which en visages the liberaliza-
tion of the most important trade flow; that of economic, technical 
and financial co-operation which will be given' depending on the le-
vel of development of each of the countries concerned; that of hu-
man co-operation concerning workers and in particular Mediterranean 
migrant workers. 
The beneficiaries of this policy will be those Mediterranean 
countries that desire to participate. The agreements would in prin-
ciple have an indeterminate duration, signed on the willingness to 
co-operate in the long run. 
Yet, the proposals that the Community offered to the Mediterra-
nean Countries at the end of June 1973 are not of the sort that sij--
tisfy its partners. Agricultural concessions are limited, and the 
outlines of co-operation are still undefined, nothing has as yet been 
said on the amount of financial aid. But the first step has now been 
taken, the foundations for formulating a policy based on the doctrine 
of a coherent whole aimed at promoting the development of this re-
gion in search of peace and stability exist. The first proof of sin-
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cerity was undertaken in autumn of 1973 during the final phases of 
negotiations with the countries already noted. These had already 
stated that the proposals made included an obvious element of dis-
equilibrium. This disequilibrium arises from the fact that the Com-
munity exports more than it imports from the Maghreb countries and 
even more so from Spain and Israel. 
Particularly for the latter two, the disequilibrium of the envisag-
ed concessions depend on the Community's choice which provides 
for establishing with them free trade for industrial products (cover-
ing the main export items) and limited concessions in the agricul-
tural sector (where an important proportion of the Community part-
ners' exports lies). In such circumstances, it is clear that industrial 
free trade is to the advantage of the EEC, the Mediterranean count-
ries lose all the foreign excha'nge for the ultimate benefit of com-
plementary concessions in the agricultural sector. 
The negative reactions of the Mediterranean countries that had 
undertaken a new renegotiations with the Community in the frame-
work of the 'global approach' and which everyone has been quoting, 
should not make one forget that the dialogue has just started. The 
complementary mandates will improve the Community offer and the 
final outcome will be that of all such negotiations: a certain disap-
pointment with the results obtained mixed with a hope of an event-
ual development of the contents of the agreements. 
In fact if, as we have said, the Council of Ministers has accept-
ed the proposals of the Commission in principle, it could not fol-
low them in their entirety, which would have demanded a 'wider' 
mandate and probably would have proved satisfactory for their part-
ners in negotiation. Time will however allow for 'correcting the 
aim' and to put on a more appropriate stand the line taken by the 
Commission in matters concerning new relations with the Mediterra-
nean. 
v: CONCLUSIONS: LONG-TERM HOPES 
We have tried to examine the first steps in a European economic 
policy for the countries of the Mediterranean basin, which had its 
inception at nearly the same time as the birth of the Community and 
which has been conditioned all through these years by the limits of 
the internal development of the latter. 
126 
If the member states have not yet undertaken commitments corres-
ponding to the importance of the Mediterranean region for the future 
of Europe itself, this has not been the cause of a protectionism of-
ten determined by electoral frenzies or the fear of having to dish 
out an unknown sum of money. These are on the contrary the very 
problems of internal Community development which obstruct action 
in a coherent manner towards the rest of the world. The opulen t 
north of the European Industrial triangle has hardly reduced. the di-
vergence which seperates it from the less prospereous regions, or 
eliminated the structural disequilibria, or alleviated the income dif-
ferentials and the contrasts in human conditions. It follows that 
the persistence of a certain under-development in Europe largely 
conditions any constructive efforts to participate in solving the de-
velopmc:nt problems of others. And, with respect to this, the re-
sources allocated to the 'restructuring of agriculture and industries 
in decline constitute a less visible but a more certain contribution 
in favour of third world coun tries besides the less developed 
countries of t!;le Mediterranean region. 
Although the Mediterranean policy (just like that towards the 
other less prosperous countries) is conditioned by the progress of 
European Integration, it is a big risk to wait, before making a 
choice, for the realization of objectives such as that of the econo-
mic and monetary union. 
The Mediterranean Policy, just like development policy in gene-
ral, should be one of permanent concern to the Community during 
the establishment of commml policies, a constant and a component 
of European Policy itself. 
In my opinion, the Mediterranean region constitutes probably the 
only field for the realization of a development effort having an ori-
ginal character, using means which surpass and up date traditional 
formulas. There exist, in fact, on the two sides of the Mediterra-
nean, a series of favourable conditions economic, social and cul-
tural, forces which link, for better or for worse, the partners of this 
reglon. 
This Mediterranean, which had lost its sense of unity for two 
thousand years, reappears as a reality in its own right, a planet 
distinct but not isolated from the space of the third world. The in-
terdependence with the old continent, the civilization of which it 
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has so profoundly influenced would strongly integrate the Mediter-
ranean in the context of economic growth of an expanding Europe, 
where very largely hinges the lot and stability of the Mediterranean 
region and where will depend in their turn, very largely, the security 
and prosperity of Europe. 
The risk is that the Community, due to its newly attained dimen-
sions and its increased economic power, would forget its responsi-
bility and become,. for the rest of the world, the 'ugly Europe' of 
the eighties. This possible egoism could retard all serIous efforts 
of development in the Mediterranean, efforts which are not only de-
sirable or possible, but just plainly necessary. Necessary, not 
solely for our Southern neighbours, but for a grand Europe, a domi-
nating economic power, the strength of its essential roots soaked 
in this living water. And we all know what happens to the big-
gest and most be autiful of trees if by any misfortune the ir roots 
come to die. 
A commitment based on co-operation with the Mediterranean and 
aiming at a progressive reduction of tensions caused by skewed 
development would entail obvious costs. Maintaining the existent 
disequilibrium can entail even higher costs, of immediate nature 
for the less developed Mediterranean countries, and eventually to 
the Community. With regard to this point, I adopt here the conclu-
sions of a Euro-Mediterranean debate organized by OCIPE ll at Bm-
xelles in December 1972: 'A growth which only pursues itself 
leads to its own distruction and to harass those that slave for it as 
well as those that are excluded. To care to share with others who 
are less advantaged, is to contribute the means by which to provide 
for the good of man. It also means following the way of a true co-
operation, respecting the interests and dignity of one's partner. 
These are no longer times when Europe could impose its hegemony 
in the Mediterranean. A better task is awai cing her: working to out-
line a link between North and South, in order to become again the 
11 This debate with the theme 'The Community and the Mediterranean Ba-
sin: matters at stake and ways for co-operation and development', involv-
ed represtatives of Mediterranean countries, EEC diplomats and adminis-
trators, industrialists, union representatives and migrant workers besides 
research :workers. 
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place of exchange and mutual enrichment between peoples and cul-
tures' • 
So far it has been a question of responsibilities and choice put 
at Europe's door step. But all development efforts and all Commu-
nity initiatives in the matter cannot succeed unless the Mediterra-
nean countries desire this kind of dialogue, which must be based 
strictly on a parity basis and in respect of the sovereignty of part-
ners. Within this context,. the Mediterranean countries must move 
towards forms of co-operation which permit a more rational utiliza-
tion of each one's resources. At the overall level of the region, this 
is not yet possible, and sub-regional co-operation will be an indes-
pensable stage.' 
This requires the will power and courage to overcome national 
egoism and the ease to play the demogogue: The choice lies with 
each country in either harming itself in ignoring the effort or build 
up a solidarity in co-operation. The fields open for co-operation 
are not lacking: development, transportation, enviornment, energy, 
trade, and tourism. This concentration of effort will result, in the 
end, in bringing the centre of gravity of the Mediterranean to the 
Mediterranean. This would be moreover a way in which to identify 
a position in relation to Europe in trying to put forward a common 
front in order to thereby strengthen the region's. negotiation posi-
tion. 
Efforts aimed at attaining organization at the level of the Medi-
terranean area already exist, the Maghreb experience is an exam-
ple. These must be expanded upon and reinforced to define a solu-
ti~n, which -if it does not amount to common stands, at least avoids 
contradiction in respect of the development problems of the region. 
It is an effort whi-ch would be worth realizing: perhaps it might sig-
nify a Mediterranean 'renaissance' and offer the basis for a twen-
tieth century civilization. 
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ANNEXES 
A. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EEC AND MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES AND THEIR CONTENTS: 
(a) Summary Table 
(b) Complementary protocols concluded as a result of enlarge-
ment of the Community 
(c) A systematic description of the contents of the Articles. 
B. ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL DATA: 
(a) A summary table of economic data 














Plan of Agreements signed between 
the Community and Mediterranean Countries 
(as in 1st September 1973) 
DATE OF DATE OF DURATION ENTRY 




5 years 1.09.1969 31.08.1974 
5 years 1.09.1969 31.08.1974 
5 years 1.04.1971 31.03.1976 
4 years 1.06.1973 30.06.1977 
6 years 1.10.1970 no fixed (minimum) date 
5 years 1.10.1970 30.09.1975 
5 years signed on 18.12.1972 
5 years signed on 18.12.1972 
unlimited 1.01.1973 
NON-PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS 
LEBANON (1) 3 years 1.07.1968 30.06.1971 
can be extended annual 
for 1 year reviewing 
YUGOSLAVIA 3 years 1.05.1970 1.05.1973 (2) 
















(2) A new 5 year Agreement followed the expiry of the first 




COMPLEMENTARY PROTOCALS CONCLUDED AS A RESULT 
OF COMMUNITY. ENLARGEMENT 
(as in September 1973) 





Malta Not yet signed 
Cyprus 19.12.1972 1.06.1973 
Spain 29.01.1973 30.03.1973 
Israel 30.01.1973 29.03.1973 
Egypt 19.12.1973 
Lebanon Not yet signed 
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MEDITERRANEAN BASIN AGREEMENTS 
(scheme of contents) 
COUNTRY GREECE 
A Type 0/ Agreement Association Agreement Art. 238 
B Objective 0/ Agreement A customs union with eventual adhe-
sion as final objective 
C Trade Concessions made: - free entry for industrial products 
- by the EEC 
- free entry for agricultural products 
included in a list covering practi-
cally all EEC imports from Greece 
D Trade Concessions made: - establishing a customs union in 
1984 
- favouring the EEC 
- situation in 1973: reduction of 
80% for the list of 12 years; reduc-
tion of 28% for the list of 22 years 
E Other non-Commercial - Progressive harmonization of agri-
provisions cultural policies 
- Establishment of free circulation 
of persons and services; date to 
be fixed by Association Council 
- Rapproachment of rules of compe-
tition 
- Community financial Assistance 
'* These provisions have been sus-





A Association Agreement Art. 238 Association Agreement Art. 238 
B A customs union with eventual Free Trade Area 
adhesion as final objective 
C I - free entry for industrial pro-
ducts (except textiles and re-
fined petroleum products) 
- a rate of reduction for a list 
of agricultural products (= 
95% of imports coming from 
Turkey) 
D I - tariff reductions since 1971 
will progressively lead to 
the formation of a customs 
union in 1986 
E I - discretionary introduction of 
the common agricultural poli-
cy in 22 years 
- Harmonization of rights of es-
tablishment and free render-
ing of services 
- Rapproachment of rule's of 
Competition 
- Labour: free circulation to be 
attained between 1974 and 
1986 
- Financial assistance (2nd 
protocol will come to an end 
in May 1975): loans of E.l.B. 
= 247 millions U.C. due to 
enlargement 
Total imports: covering 81.5% 
(1970) 
Industrial Imports: 100% except 
cork and refined petroleum pro-
ducts. 
Agricultural Imports: 44.7% 
(1970) 
Rate of Reduction: 
Industrial Sector: 100% 
Agricultural Sector: 50 to 
100% 
(citrus 80%) 
- reduction from 20 to 30% of 
customs tariff for 44.8% of 





A I Association Agreement: Art. 238 Association Agreement: Art. 
238 
B Free Trade Area Customs Union 
C Total Imports: covering 74.9% (1970) - Industrial Products (except 
Other imports besides those with no ECSC products): 
tariff: 62.6% tariff concession: 70% 
Industrial Imports: 100% (except for covering: 100% 
cor·k and refined petroleum products. - Agricultural Products: 
I Agricultural Imports: 57.5% no conceSSions 
Rate of Agricultural Reduction: 50 
to 100% 
Industri al Sector: 100% 
D No preferential tariffs opening up of 
- Industrial Products 
I quotas tariff concession 35% I 
covering 81% 
I 
- Agricultural Products 




- Passage from one stage to 
another of a common agree-
ment 
- No fiscal discrimination 
- No discrimination between 
memberstates, nationals and 
Community and Maltese com-
paOles 
- Dumping; sectoral, regional 




A Association Agreement: Art. 238 Preferential Trade Agreement Art. 
113 
B Customs Union Free Trade Area 
C - Industrial Products (except - Industrial products (except ECSC 
ECSC products): products) 
tariff concession: 70% tariff concessions of 60 to 70% + 
covering: 100% on a limited number, 40% covering 
- Agricultural Products: 95% 
various concessions covering - Agricultural Products 
78% various concessions covering 61%. 
D - Industrial Products - Industrial products 
tariff concession 35% Tariff concessions: 3 lists cover-
covenng 55% ing: 80% 
- Agricultural Products - Agricultural Products 
tariff concession 35% Tariff concessions or committment 
covering 35% to buy certain dairy products co-
vering: 43% 
E Similar provisions as those made Similar provisions to those made 
in the Malta Agreement in the Malta Agreement. 
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ISRAEL EGYPT 
A Preferential Trade Agreement Preferential Trade Agreement 
Art. 113 Art. 113 
B Free Trade Area Free Trade Area 
C - 50% reduction of the CET for - 55% reduction of the CET for 
80% of imports of industrial 45% of industrial products 
products. having a positive duty (except 
- Reductions of 30 to 40% for for cotton thread). 
a limited number of agricul-
tural products covering ap- - Reductions of 25% to 40% of 
prox 80% of imports of agri- CET for agricultural products 
cultural products. + an economic advantage eq-
ual to 25% of the levy on rice 
equal to 50% of imports. 
D - Reductions of 10 to 30% ac- - Reduction of 30 to 50% for 3 
cording to 5 lists of indus t- lists of products representing 
rial products. about 30% of Community ori-
- Potential preferenc~ for a ginating imports subj ect to 
list of products at nil duty positive duties. 
covering: 65% of imports. 
E Similar provisions to those Similar provisions to those 




A Preferential Trade Agreement Non-Preferential Trade Agree-
Art. li3 ~ ment Art. 113 - extended until 
entry into force of the agree-
ment signed: 26/6/1973. 
B Free Trade Area Application of the most favoured 
nation clause. 
C - Industrial Products - Reduction of the levy on im-
(ECSC products included). ports of baby-beef coming 
nil duty by 1.7.1977 except from Yugoslavia. 
paper and cotton (1.1.1984). N.B. Yugoslavia is one of the 
principal beneficiaries of the 
Control over certain textile EEC Generalized Scheme of 
products up to 1.1.1980. Preferences. 
- Agricultural Products 
various concessions 
covering: 64%. 
D - Industrial Products 
tariff concessions: 3 lists: 
(7.1977) (1.1980) (1.1985). 
- Agricultural Products 
Commitment to maintain or 
increase the EEC ratio of 
Portughese imports. (Con-
cerning 25% of imports com-
ing from the EEC). 
E - Provisions allowing for the The new agreement provides for 
possibility of developing the dialogue concerning migrant la-
relations established by the bour. 
agreement to the degree and. 
in the ateas which the CUt- I 






A Preferential Trade Agreement Art. 
I 113 
B Free Trade Area J 
• C - 55% reduction of the CET for 58% 
of industrial products. 
I 
- Reduction of 30 to 50% for certain 
agricultural products representing 
approx 40% of imports coming from 
Lebanon. 
D - Reduction of 6 to 70% for 3 lists 
of products covering about 20% of 
imports coming from the EEC. 
E Similar provisions to those made 
in the Malta Agreement. 
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POPULATION ACTIVE. POPULATION GROSS NATIONAL 1970 PRODUCT 
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1,000 % 1,000 1,000 % 1,000 $ % 
Spain 33,645 1.1 12,160 4,099 34 34,360 1,020 6.1 
Israel 2,910 3.2 1,047 110 10 5,690 1,960 4.7 
Malta 330 0.0 99 8 8 270 810 5.8 
Cyprus 625 1.1 265 92 35 590 950 5.3 
Lebanon 2,726 2~5 726 344 47 1,610 590 0.5 
Egypt 33,329 2.5 9,026 4,942 55 6,870 210 1.7 
Libya 1,940 3.7 514 219 43 3,420 1,770 20.4 
Syria 6,098 2.9 1,549 756 49 1,750 290 3.4 
Jordan 2,317 3.5 543 210 39 570 250 2.9 
Portugal 9,635 0.9 3,353 1,227 37 6,390 660 5.3 
Morocco 15,495 2.9 4,108 2,489 61 3,600 230 1.0 
Tunisia 5,075 3.0 1,323 614 46 1,270 250 0.5 
Algeria 14,330 3.1 3,298 1,837 56 4,270 300 1.7 
Yugoslavia 20,540 1.1 7,642 4,083 53 13,340 650 4.3 
Albania 2,170 2.9 921 571 62 1,290 600 4.8 
Greece 8,892 0.7 3,944 1,836 46 9,700 1,090 6.6 
Turkey 35,230 2.5 15,841 10,940 69 10,860 310 3.9 
SOURCE: WORLD BANK: FAO 
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